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Introduction
            Graduate students across the country are often required to complete a set amount of hours working as a
graduate assistant in order to earn their degree. These graduate assistant hours are typically earned by working
as either a research assistant or a teaching assistant, depending on which type of program the student is
enrolled in.[2] The relationship between the students and their institutions presents some interesting legal
questions, particularly for teaching assistants. The most intriguing question that arises is whether these
students should be considered employees as de ned under the National Labor and Relations Act. The
distinction is an important one; classifying graduate students as employees would grant them rights and
privileges that other types of employees are entitled to, most notably the right to enter collective bargaining
agreements to negotiate for less required hours and university health insurance.[3]
The National Labor and Relations Act (NLRA) governs this type of issue, and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) hears and settles claims brought under the Act working as a quasi-judicial entity.[4] The NLRB
was  rst presented with the question of university-employed graduate students in 1972,[5] and the issue has
never fully been resolved. In 2004, the Board seemed to end the dispute once and for all when it ruled
a rmatively that students were not employees under the NLRA.[6] However, the issue was not settled for long;
the Board overruled itself in August 2016, holding that “student assistants who have a common-law
employment relationship with their university are statutory employees under the [National Labor Relations]
Act.”[7] This ruling only applies to private institutions, as state statutes govern public university employment,[8]
but the implications are still far-reaching.
Unfortunately, the Columbia University ruling was just the latest example of inconsistency in NLRB decisions.[9]
Perhaps the best explanation for why the Board is consistently overruling itself is the political nature of the
board itself; board members are appointed by the President of the United States, and every member has a  xed
term of  ve years.[10] Presidents appoint candidates who will bring a conservative or liberal approach to the
Board, depending on what views the President at the time of appointment holds. A conservative board would
likely have no problem overruling a liberal board, and vice versa. This, coupled with the fact that NLRB decisions
are only somewhat binding precedent even if a rmed by a federal circuit court,[11] means that there is no clear
indication that the court will stop overruling itself at any time in the near future.
The NLRB is simply not  t to create a  nal, lasting precedent from a procedural standpoint.[12] Therefore, the
only way this issue can truly be resolved is for Congress to amend the National Labor Relations Act and end the
dispute once and for all. The original Act was passed in 1935,[13] and has not been signi cantly altered by
Congress since the passing of the Landrum-Gri n Act in 1959.[14] Almost all areas of the law have changed
drastically in the last sixty years, and labor law is no different. The unique relationship between universities and
their graduate students as they operate today was very likely not foreseen or contemplated when the NLRA was
drafted or last amended.
Aside from being the only legitimate avenue for endorsing a speci c reading of the National Labor Relations
Act, Congress is the entity best equipped to decide such a complex and far-reaching issue. In 2015, there were
over 130,000 students employed by their universities in a teaching assistant role.[15] Despite the competency
of NLRB members, this issue is simply too large to be decided by a panel of  ve appointed o cials. Students
and universities both make compelling arguments advancing their positions. Students point to the fact that
teaching assistants often  ll roles that would otherwise have to be  lled by adjunct faculty which are
considered employees.[16] Universities, on the other hand, feel that classifying graduate students as
employees would hamper their freedom to create a rigorous and challenging curriculum.[17]
This Note seeks to further explain the complex issue of graduate students as university employees and
advocate Congressional action. Part One brie y explains the procedural structure of the National Labor
Relations Board and how it operates. Part Two summarizes the history of Board rulings in regard to graduate
students as employees, including the two most recent rulings on the matter, Brown University and Columbia
University. It further identi es how the two opinions differ beyond their ultimate result. Part Three advocates for
Congress to amend the National Labor Relations Act by adding students to the list of groups which are not
covered by the Act, effectively denying them the classi cation of employee. In making this argument, the Note
will point out the  aws of the Columbia University decision, discuss the practical effects of the decision, and
explain why the rights of the universities must prevail from a policy standpoint.
I. The National Labor Relations Act Overview
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A. Passing of the Act and Mechanics of the Board
In passing the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, Congress made it a point to explain why it believed the
legislation was needed.[18] Upon reading the “[D]eclaration of [P]olicy” section, it becomes clear that the key
objective of the Act was to help make up for the inequality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.[19] Enacted under the authority of the Commerce Clause,[20] the drafters seemed to believe that
the right to collective bargaining was the most powerful tool employees could harness against their employers
in their plight for competitive wages and improved working conditions.[21]
If protected by the NLRA, the students’ argument is a strong one. There is a clear lack of bargaining power, and
the remedy they seek is expressly endorsed by the Act.[22] The key question at issue, however, is whether the
students are “employees” under the statute.[23] The Act has some peculiar jurisdictional limitations in de ning
what types of employees and employers are covered. Generally, almost all private sector employers are
regulated by the Act, so long as their activity in interstate commerce exceeds a minimal level.[24] Notably, all
forms of government employment are excluded from NLRA jurisdiction.[25] This includes federal, state, and
local governments, and it extends to their entities such as libraries and parks, wholly-owned government
corporations, and most relevant for our purposes, public schools.[26] Governmental bodies aren’t the only types
of employers excluded from the Act, however; agricultural-based employers, as well as employees subject to
the Railway Labor Act, also do not fall within its jurisdiction. [27]
If a labor issue arises out of a provision of the Act and the employer is not excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Act, then disputes are settled by the National Labor Relations Board, in a sense acting as the judicial
component of the agency.[28] The Board is comprised of  ve members, who are appointed by the President
with advice and consent of the United States Senate.[29] Each board member serves a regular  ve-year term,
unless appointed mid-term to  ll a vacancy.[30] Disputes are generally heard by three-member panels unless
the case at hand is signi cant enough to warrant consideration of all  ve board members.[31] This practice
was called into question in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, where the Supreme Court held hundreds of NLRB
rulings invalid, reasoning that at least three members of the Board must sit on the deciding panel for a decision
to be legally enforceable.[32]
It is unsurprising that NLRB appointments today are highly politicized decisions.[33] What is surprising,
however, is that the partisan nature of appointments is a relatively new phenomenon. Commentators have
pointed to the Eisenhower administration as the  rst to appoint a NLRB member whose background clearly
indicated a possible bias towards the president’s personal viewpoints.[34] The trend continued until eventually
Presidents Reagan and Clinton became the  rst presidents to appoint nominees who possessed clear
Republican and Democratic partisanship, respectively.[35]
Today, nominating a partisan NLRB member is business as usual;[36] but what are the impacts of partisan
nominations? These partisan nominations have shaped the determination of “sharply contested issues of law
and policy” before the Board.[37]  There is substantial anecdotal evidence of the partisan nature of the NLRB,
and the few scholarly studies on the issue generally  nd that “the party of the appointing president in uences
the NLRB’s output.”[38] Scholars disagree to what extent background affects member ideology,[39] but most
would likely agree that to some extent, “a presidential administration can make or change labor policy without
legislative action through appointments to the NLRB.”[40] Given the importance of labor issues covered under
the NLRA, and the predictability of how members will vote,[41] appointing NLRB members is one of the most
quietly in uential appointment decisions a sitting president will make.
Perhaps the best restraint on the President’s authority is not a law, or even the Senate con rmation
requirement, but the custom that of the  ve appointed Board members no more than three should come from
the President’s political party.[42] Still, even with this custom in place, it is plainly obvious that a “change in
presidential administration from Republican to Democrat gives rise to a pro-labor shift in NLRB performance,
and a change from Democrat to Republican produces a pro-business shift.”[43]
B. The Non-Binding Nature of Decisions Demands that Congress Must Act for Meaningful NLRA Clari cation
Though the NLRB assuredly acts as a judicial body in the way that it adjudicates claims and disputes, its
decisions are more accurately described as an agency order.[44] The Board may issue a ruling, but the order is
not self-enforcing.[45] If a charged party refuses to comply, the Board must seek enforcement from the
appropriate appellate court.[46] Likewise, if a party wishes to dispute an order, it can go to the courts to have
the Board decision remanded or voided.[47] Even if a federal appellate court upholds or strikes down a decision
of the Board, the decision is only binding on the case at issue, and it does not set precedent for future Board
rulings.[48]
The practical effect of all of this is that newly appointed Boards are free to overrule previous rulings in
adjudicating new disputes, and they do so often.[49] Given that Boards’ ideologies differ greatly depending on
the president which appointed the members,[50] and the fact that Boards are not constrained by stare decisis
when deciding their cases,[51] it is unsurprising that a new Board would be all too eager to overturn previous
Board rulings the  rst time they have the opportunity to do so. The process of overturning prior Board rulings is
problematic, but constitutional nonetheless.[52] In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States not only
condoned this sort of  ip- opping, but encouraged it by holding that “[t]he responsibility to adapt the Act to
changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board,”[53] and that past decisions can be reconsidered
to re ect that.[54]
The lack of uniformity and predictability is a major concern for practicing attorneys and parties alike. A former
Board Member, frustrated with the current system, notes “[a]s a matter of policy, these  ip- ops reduce public
and judicial con dence in the Board. In practice, this oscillation also reduces both management and labor’s
reliance on Board law because neither side is sure what the future will hold.”[55]
Because of its partisan nature and the lack of binding precedent, the NLRB is simply not equipped to create a
true resolution of the classi cation of a graduate student under the Act. Any ruling on the classi cation of
graduate students as an employee under the Act can and likely will be overturned as soon as a new Board is
appointed.[56] Further, both academic institutions and graduate students will be hesitant to act, even if a ruling
is made in their favor, knowing that the current status quo can be usurped at any time.[57] The issue of
graduate students under the NLRA must be addressed by Congress to  nally put the debate to rest.
Though ineffective at creating lasting policy because of the Board’s nonobservance of stare decisis,[58] the
NLRB is not useless by any stretch. In fact, it may have been a goal of Congress to create the Board in such a
way that it could not create rigid, binding precedent.[59] Board members generally have valuable experience or
expertise in labor or employment law,[60] and their insights and reasoning in solving disputes should be taken
seriously. Though only Congress can permanently answer the question of how to treat student-employees, in
making its decision Congress would be wise to consider how the Board has handled the issue for the last 45
years.[61] The following section will examine a timeline of such cases, and demonstrate how both a
Republican-appointed Board and a Democrat-appointed Board acted when most recently presented with the
issue.[62]
II. Where the Issue Arises and How the NLRB Has Handled It
A. De ning “Employee” Under Section 2(3) and Interpreting the De nition
The heart of the issue in all of the student-employee labor disputes is whether or not the students are
considered employees under the NLRA.[63] The Act provides a de nition of “employee,” which is the source of
the litigation. In pertinent part, the Act de nes employee in the following manner:
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise … but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor
Act … or by any other person who is not an employer as herein de ned.[64]
            Generally, interpretation of this de nition comes down to competing theories of statutory construction;
speci cally, the competing theories of textualism and other intentionalist theories.[65] When used by judicial
bodies, textualism—which focuses on the text of the statute at issue—is usually employed by conservative
judges, whereas intentionalist theories—which focus on Congressional intent or the purpose of the statute—are
often employed by liberal judges.[66] The Board, however, is not a true judicial body but rather a branch of an
administrative agency.[67] Because of its unique nature, some interesting questions arise; most notably, what
interpretation the Board should apply, or whether or not it should even apply a statutory interpretation theory at
all.[68]
            A textualist approach makes the analysis somewhat easy in regarding the determination of employment
status under the NLRA. Under the “expressio unius” statutory interpretation maxim, which provides that “[w]hen
a provision sets forth a general rule followed by speci c exceptions to that rule, one must assume–absent
other evidence–that no further exceptions are intended,”[69] a strong argument could be made that students
are employees because they are not listed alongside the other exceptions.[70] In other words, the argument
under the doctrine of expressio unius is the drafters of the Act made a conscious effort to name speci c
exceptions to the general rule but did not include students; a Court interpreting the Act should not include
students where the drafters deliberately excluded them. The expressio unius maxim is a subset of the larger
interpretation doctrine of textualism.[71]
            Intentionalist theories, on the other hand, involve a somewhat murkier analysis, though they could
arguably lead to more ‘fair’ results.[72] Intentionalism itself has multiple sub-categories; some judges ask
themselves what the enacting legislature would have done with the issue at hand, while others query what
interpretation would best serve the true purpose of the law.[73] These methods are called intentionalism and
purposivism, respectively.[74] To employ either of these methods requires a judge to make his or her subjective
decision as to what Congress would have wanted or what the purpose of the law was.[75] To put one’s self in
the shoes of a 1935 legislator is a di cult thought experiment which could produce any number of results.
            Both textualist and intentionalist approaches are widely used by judicial bodies,[76] but the overarching
question remains: should the NLRB act as a judicial body, or the administrative agency that it truly is? Unlike
Courts, administrative agencies are well equipped to legitimately make policy choices.[77] Courts are generally
tasked with merely interpreting a statute before them, whereas an administrative agency’s “are expected to
make policy choices much more so than the courts, a role that has been upheld by the Supreme Court.”[78]
Though the agency’s role of promoting policy is often relegated to interpreting its own authority,[79] it can
abandon this role in the interest of promoting policy related to the statute it administers.[80] This practice may
cause some to raise an eyebrow, but it has been condoned by the Supreme Court so long as the policy the
agency is promoting is reasonable.[81]
The differences in how Courts and the NLRB operate tends to give credence to the idea that an intentionalist
approach, speci cally purposivism, is better suited to resolve disputes at issue. Accepting that an
administrative agency may legitimately promote its policy,[82] textualism seems like an odd vehicle to ful ll
that duty. Policy, unlike a statute or the Constitution, is ever-changing, and continually reading statutes under a
textualist lens fails to give agencies the opportunity to re ect those changes.[83] Additionally, ruling that an
argument fundamentally promotes an agency’s policy, rather than merely  nding an argument is valid under a
textualist reading of the statue, seems much more effective at establishing and continually endorsing said
policy.
B. A Brief History of Pre-Brown Graduate Assistant Decisions
The issue of teaching assistants and other graduate students is not a new one; in the early 1970’s, the Board
ruled on two cases that set an early precedent on the matter. The  rst, Adelphi University, held that graduate
students were not employees of their university; therefore they were not  t to join the rest of the faculty when
collectively bargaining.[84] The Board placed a great deal of emphasis on the differences between the regular
faculty and the graduate assistants. The functions the students performed, they reasoned, were primarily
academic with only some faculty-related tasks.[85] Additionally, because the student’s employment relationship
could not exist without the established academic relationship, the court held that the two groups were too
distinct to be included in the bargaining unit.[86]
Two years later, the Board solidi ed its position in Adelphi University and expanded upon it. In The Leland
Stanford Junior University case, the Board held explicitly that because graduate assistants were “primarily”
students, they were not statutory employees under the NLRA.[87] The Board also considered the nature of their
employment standing alone and how it compared to a traditional University employee. Unlike non-student
employees, the University had little control over the students’ research projects and students were not paid in
accordance with the value of their work.[88] The Board found that the true employment relationship was “a
situation of students within certain academic guidelines having chosen particular projects on which to spend
the necessary time, as determined by the project’s needs.”[89]
The Leland and Adelphi decisions lasted for over 25 years before being overturned by New York University in
2000.[90] The New York University Board did not act completely on its own. Instead, the reasoning for
overturning Leland was borrowed from another decision, Boston Medical Center, which created a new standard
of determining employment on the basis of the common law master-servant doctrine.[91] Applying the
standard, the Board determined that the students were statutory employees under Section 2(3);[92] this was
the  rst time students ever received such classi cation.[93] In determining whether or not a master-servant
relationship existed, the Board reasoned that it exists when “a servant performs services for another, under the
other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”[94] Aside from examining the common law
employment relationships, the Board also took a textualist approach, noting that Congress had made speci c
exceptions to the general rule and student-employees were not one of them.[95]
C. Brown Versus Columbia – Under the Microscope
The two most recent disputes on the matter illustrate where the Board stands now, and what reasoning it used
to arrive there. The cases are factually indistinguishable for all relevant purposes, and the issue is identical.[96]
So how did the two cases, decided merely 12 years apart, arrive at opposite conclusions? This section attempts
to answer that question by identifying the underlying causes.
i. Brown Analysis
Brown overturned NYU and held that graduate students were not employees as de ned by the NLRA.[97] The
ruling in Brown can be condensed down to three major conclusions, the  rst of which is that the relationship is
primarily and unequivocally an academic one.[98] The justi cation for this claim is similar to that of pre-NYU
cases; namely, that the students’ employment relationship exists only to the extent that it is part of the
academic relationship.[99] Still, the Board realized that under a textualist reading it doesn’t matter if the
relationship was primarily an academic one, so long as an employment relationship existed.[100] To pre-
emptively combat such a counter-argument, the Board unabashedly explained that their “interpretation of
Section 2(3) followed the fundamental rule that ‘a reviewing court should not con ne itself to examining a
particular statutory provision in isolation.’”[101] The Board then concluded this argument by deciding under a
purposivism approach that an employee was covered under the Act only if the relationship was a
“fundamentally economic relationship.”[102]
A second conclusion the Board made is that allowing students to collectively bargain based on their
employment relationship would undoubtedly cause adverse effects to their academic relationship.[103] More
speci cally, by limiting an institution’s right to require some number of hours spent in a graduate assistant role,
students would in effect be hampering that institution’s ability to set their own curriculum.[104] The Board even
went so far as to say that “[i]mposing collective bargaining would have a deleterious impact on overall
educational decisions by the Brown faculty and administration.”[105] Here, one can see the Board fully
embracing its role as policymaker,[106] by focusing on what policy it wishes to promote and the practical
effects of a ruling, rather than merely interpreting the statute it administers. The Board in this instance clearly
saw academic sovereignty as a legitimate policy concern.
The  nal argument that the Board endorsed in Brown is quite distinct from the previous two, and it was not
contemplated by the Board in any of the pre-NYU decisions. The thrust of the argument is that payments made
to teaching assistants shouldn’t be considered compensation, rather that they were merely part of a student’s
 nancial aid package.[107] This claim demands attention. The Board considered evidence presented by the
University; incoming graduate students often received letters which stated if they “maintain satisfactory
progress toward the Ph.D., [they] will continue to receive some form of  nancial aid in [their] second through
fourth years of graduate study at Brown, most probably as a teaching assistant or research assistant.”[108]
Additionally, the Board pointed out that funding for the programs was provided by third-party donors,[109] and
“the amount of stipend received is the same regardless of the number of hours spent performing services. The
awards do not include any bene ts, such as vacation and sick leave, retirement, or health insurance.”[110] All of
this evidence would lead one to believe that the relationship between the University and the students were not
so similar to a common-law employment relationship under a New York University analysis.[111]
ii. Columbia Analysis
Brown lasted for 12 years, until being overturned by Columbia.[112] The Columbia Board was very critical of the
Brown decision, and a considerable amount of the opinion is refuting arguments the Board had accepted in
Brown.[113] The Board speci cally took exception to the fact that Brown’s reasoning seemingly ignored a
textualist approach altogether.[114] Though Columbia did not advocate a strictly textualist approach, the Board
believed that the “fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame the issue of statutory coverage
not in terms of the existence of an employment relationship, but rather on whether some other relationship
between the employee and the employer is the primary one.”[115] That standard was “neither derived from the
statutory text of Section 2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.”[116]
Columbia’s disapproval of Brown did not stop with statutory interpretation theories. When the Columbia Board
embraced its role as policymaker,[117] it questioned the legitimacy of Brown’s conclusions. Claiming that the
reasoning relied on by the Brown Board was “almost entirely theoretical,” they concluded that “[t]he Brown
University Board failed to demonstrate that collective bargaining between a university and its employed
graduate students cannot coexist successfully with student-teacher relationships, with the educational
process, and with the traditional goals of higher education.”[118] Instead of speculating on what might happen
if students were ruled to be employees, the Board examined public universities where students were already
allowed to unionize and concluded that collective bargaining had a positive effect on the student-employees,
without nearly as many detriments as Brown predicted.[119][120] 
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